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ScienceDirectWe undertake a review of academic literature that examines the
effectiveness and equity-related performance of PES initiatives
targeting biodiversity conservation in tropical and sub-tropical
countries. We investigate the key features of such analyses as
regards their analytical and methodological approach and we
identify emerging lessons from PES practice, leading to a new
suggested research agenda. Our results indicate that analyses
of PES effectiveness have to date focused on either ecosystem
service provision or habitat proxies, with only half of them
making explicit assessment of additionality and most
describing that payments have been beneficial for land cover
and biodiversity. Studies evaluating the impact of PES on
livelihoods suggest more negative outcomes, with an uneven
treatment of the procedural and distributive considerations of
scheme design and payment distribution, and a large
heterogeneity of evaluative frameworks. We propose an
agenda for future PES research based on the emerging interest
in assessing environmental outcomes more rigorously and
documenting social impacts in a more comparative and
contextually situated form.
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Payments for Environmental or Ecosystem Services
(PES) have become a means to promote biodiversity
conservation and rural development, particularly in tropi-
cal and sub-tropical regions [1]. National or regional PES
programs are currently implemented in countries like
Costa Rica, Mexico, Ecuador, Vietnam, China, South
Africa or the United States, while smaller regional pro-
grams have been tested in European countries like
Germany and the UK [2]. Small-scale PES projects pro-
moted by non-governmental organizations to enhance
watershed protection and biodiversity conservation, as
well as to protect carbon reservoirs and sinks under the
umbrella of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change — as carbon offset and REDD+
projects — have also been developed worldwide [3].
These programs and projects have usually become part
of a conservation policy mix, in which the direct incen-
tives provided by PES co-exist with more traditional
regulatory conservation approaches [4].
Research examining the performance of PES schemes has
increased exponentially over the past decade. Academic
PES reviews to date have focused on a few programs and
projects [5], have had a single topical or geographical
focus [6–11], or have relied mostly on qualitative infor-
mation provided by project managers and conservation
organizations [12]. These analyses have sought to distill
lessons on what PES schemes have achieved in environ-
mental and livelihood terms, to explain these achieve-
ments, and to analyze what could be done to improve
design and performance.
Our review aims at a better understanding of conservation
interventions but is distinctive from existing reviews in at
least three ways. First, we focus only on peer-reviewed
publications analyzing ongoing — not planned or poten-
tial — PES initiatives implemented in tropical and sub-
tropical countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America.
These regions contain the highest concentrations of bio-
diversity on the planet and are experiencing rapid change
that is leading to the loss of biodiversity [13,14]. These
regions also contain deep, multifaceted poverty [15]
where the burden of ecosystem protection is often borne
by those least able to afford it [16]. Second, we are
principally interested in understanding if researchers
have considered PES schemes to be effective both in
achieving their biodiversity and environment-related
goals, that is, if they have achieved the goals set by thewww.sciencedirect.com
Payments for ecosystem services in the tropics Calvet-Mir et al. 151correspondent PES program or project, and to be efficient
in their use of financial resources, given that PES have
often been praised as cost-effective alternatives com-
pared to more conventional conservation instruments
[17,18]. Finally, we are interested in highlighting if
researchers have considered PES schemes to be equitable,
that is, if they have involved poor people in their design
and implementation and if they have benefited partici-
pants equally. Therefore our objective is not to judge
by ourselves if the PES cases reviewed are effective,
efficient and equitable but instead to annotate what
the reviewed article authors consider such cases to be.
We also acknowledge that the equity judgments of the
authors in the reviewed articles can be considered less
‘objective’ than effectiveness results, since such judg-
ments may depend on the scholars’ approach to the
concept and the potential for conflict between her views
and those of local people. However, we think that some
aspects of equity, for example the distribution of jobs or
income derived from PES implementation, can indeed be
measurable and thus presented with objective data, while
other equity-related criteria might be more prone to
subjectivity, such as the existence of conflicts or partici-
pation levels in PES design and implementation.
Nonetheless, we believe that all aspects deserve atten-
tion given that PES is part of a broader international
environmental governance agenda that aims to transform
the distribution of rights and responsibilities in resource
management across the world, and particularly in the
global South [19]. An equity focus is thus important to
understand if PES could serve as a means of redistribut-
ing the costs and benefits of conservation in a way that
alleviates poverty and minimizes social conflict [20,21].
Finally, throughout our analysis, we investigate the
methods employed by scholars to draw conclusions on
economic and ecological effectiveness and equity and
examine if methods and the outcomes described are
related to each other.
Overall, the findings and the resulting discussion contrib-
ute toward establishing an agenda for future PES research
by identifying data and analytical gaps, and pointing to
the opportunities and challenges lying ahead to develop
more robust research approaches. The results are also
relevant for PES practitioners to the extent we offer an
overview of existing PES schemes in sub-tropical and
tropical countries, and we call for partnerships to better
design and monitor PES worldwide.
Methods
We compiled a database of peer-reviewed literature in
Scopus for articles published between January 2003 —
the year of the publication of the first Millennium Eco-
system Assessment Report — and December 2013,
searching for the terms ‘payment for environmentalwww.sciencedirect.com services’ or ‘payment for ecosystem services’ and ‘con-
servation’ anywhere in title, abstract or keywords, and
the term ‘tropical’ anywhere in the text. The results
returned 213 (‘environmental’) and 200 (‘ecosystem’)
articles, of which over 80% had been published between
2009 and 2013, indicating the growing popularity of the
subject and the increase in scholarly attention to PES.
We targeted journal contributions that (i) analyzed one or
more implemented PES initiatives in tropical or sub-
tropical countries, excluding Australia for being a highly
developed country and China because half the country
falls outside the sub-tropics; (ii) focused on initiatives
with direct or indirect biodiversity conservation objec-
tives, that is, they targeted the conservation or restoration
of an ecosystem, or the provision of related ecosystem
service(s), and (iii) examined PES effectiveness and/or
equity considerations, such as the degree to which envi-
ronmental objectives have been achieved, people’s access
to project activities, participation in design and imple-
mentation, and the impact and distribution of incentives.
We excluded articles developing a conceptual framework,
argument or model related to PES theory, practice or the
targeting of payments [4,22–30]; focusing on analytical
issues unrelated to effectiveness and equity, such as
motivations to participate in PES [31–33]; and those that
did not include a purposive analysis of case studies, such
as summary articles in special issues, the above men-
tioned PES reviews, and articles with anecdotal evidence
on PES implementation to illustrate a related argument
[34–37].
Our final database includes 34 articles focused on
29 PES programs and projects (Table 1). The World
Bank’s sponsored RISEMP project has been implemen-
ted in different countries and we have considered each
country scheme as a separate case study. Thirty articles
examine only one PES initiative [38–47,48,49–54,
55,56,57,58–66,67], one paper focuses on two cases
[68], and three analyze three or more schemes in the
same article [69–71]. From each of these contributions,
we extracted the following information to provide some
background on the location and typology of the PES
schemes analyzed: location of the researched PES
scheme (continent, country), scheme reach (national,
local), type of service being paid for (well-defined eco-
system service, proxy), and type of land tenure where it
has been implemented (private, public, communal). We
also recorded each article’s authors, year of publication,
the PES scheme analyzed, the location of the scheme
the article is focusing on, the author(s)’ analytical objec-
tive(s), methods, the characterization of effectiveness
and/or equity by the author(s), and PES outcomes
reported. For the latter, and to reduce potential bias
in article assessment, we extracted the relevant text in
which the authors explicitly referred to effectiveness,
perceived level of additionality — i.e. the extent toCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2015, 14:150–162
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Table 1
Some key characteristics of the reviewed PES schemes.
Region Country PES scheme PES scale PES
developer
Activities paid for and link with
desired services — (Direct or
Proxy)*
Type of
tenure
Article(s)
# in
reference
list
Asia Cambodia Eco-tourism
payments
scheme
Local NGO Villagers may not hunt key
species and must abide by a
land use plan. Revenue received
from tourist visits used to support
plan overseeing and
enforcement — (P for
biodiversity conservation)
Private [71]
Asia Cambodia Agri-environment
payments
scheme
Local NGO Offers preferential prices to rice
farmers (wildlife friendly
certification) in exchange for
abiding by the land-use plan and
no-hunting rules — (P for
biodiversity conservation)
Undefined [71]
Asia Cambodia Nest
conservation
direct payments
scheme
Local NGO Farmers paid directly against
number of nests protected from
poaching — (D for bird
biodiversity protection)
Communal [71]
Asia Cambodia NGO-driven
community-
based payments
scheme
Local NGO Communities are ex ante
incentivized to develop local
institutions (committees and
land-use plans) to stop
deforestation in the buffer zone of
a protected area (P for
biodiversity conservation)
Communal [65]
Central
America
Mexico National program
of payments for
hydrological
services
National Federal
government
Farmers and communities
receive payments to conserve
forests through the development
of monitoring and patrolling
activities — (P for watershed
regulation)
Communal,
Private
[54,63,67]
Central
America
Mexico PES carbon
forestry national
program scheme
National Federal
government
Farmers and communities are
paid for forest conservation or
reforestation activities — (D for
carbon sequestration)
Communal,
Private
[46]
Central
America
Mexico Fondo
Bioclimatico
carbon project
scheme
Local NGO Farmers and communities are
paid for forest conservation or
reforestation activities — (D for
carbon sequestration)
Communal,
Private
[62,69]
Central
America
Mexico Coatepec
watershed
payments sub-
national scheme
Local Sub-national
government
(state,
municipality)
Farmers are paid for forest
conservation or reforestation
activities — (P for watershed
regulation)
Private [53]
Central
America
Mexico Monarch Butterfly
Fund payments
scheme
Local NGO Farmers and communities are
paid for forest conservation,
including monitoring and
enforcement activities — (P for
biodiversity conservation)
Communal,
Private
[47,48]
Central
America
Costa Rica PES national
program scheme
National Federal
government
Farmers are paid for forest
conservation — (P for watershed
regulation and biodiversity
conservation)
Private [39,43,44,
55,61]
Central
America
Costa Rica RISEMP project
scheme
Local Multilateral
organization
(World Bank)
Farmers are paid to develop
agro-forestry sustainable
practices — (P for biodiversity
conservation and carbon
sequestration)
Private [38,41,56]
Central
America
Costa Rica Heredia
watershed
payments
scheme
Local Sub-national
government
(state,
municipality)
Farmers are paid to convert
agricultural land into forests —
(P for watershed regulation)
Private [70]
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Table 1 (Continued )
Region Country PES scheme PES scale PES
developer
Activities paid for and link with
desired services — (Direct or
Proxy)*
Type of
tenure
Article(s)
# in
reference
list
Central
America
Nicaragua RISEMP project
scheme
Local Multilateral
organization
(World Bank)
Farmers are paid to develop
silvopastoral management
practices — (P for biodiversity
conservation and carbon
sequestration)
Private [38,40,49]
Central
America
Nicaragua San Pedro del
Norte watershed
payments
scheme
Local Sub-national
government
(state,
municipality)
Farmers are paid to convert
agricultural land into forests —
(P for watershed regulation)
Private [70]
Central
America
Guatemala Las Escobas
watershed
payments
scheme
Local NGO Enforced conservation and
adoption of SFM and sustainable
agricultural practices by
protected area inhabitants —
(P for biodiversity conservation
and watershed regulation)
Public (held in
trust by NGO)
[69]
Central
America
Belize Rio Bravo carbon
project scheme
Local NGO Forest conservation against a
deforestation and degradation
baseline scenario — (D for
carbon emissions avoided)
Public (held in
trust by NGO)
[69]
Central
America
Honduras Jesus de Otoro
watershed
payments
scheme
Local Sub-national
government
(state,
municipality)
Farmers are paid to convert
agricultural lands into forests and
develop organic agriculture —
(P for water regulation)
Private [70]
South
America
Bolivia Los Negros
watershed
payments
scheme
Local NGO Farmers are paid for avoiding
forest conversion into
agriculture — (P for water
regulation and biodiversity
conservation)
Private [42]
South
America
Bolivia Noel Kempff
climate action
project scheme
Local NGO Forest conservation against a
deforestation and degradation
baseline scenario — (D for
carbon emissions avoided)
Undefined [68]
South
America
Colombia RISEMP project
scheme
Local Multilateral
organization
(World Bank)
Farmers are paid to develop
silvopastoral management
practices — (P for biodiversity
conservation and carbon
sequestration)
Private [38]
South
America
Colombia Oak biological
corridor
payments
scheme
Local NGO Farmers are paid per hectare to
promote forest conservation by
switching to more sustainable
silvopastoral pasture
management practices that
would increase milk production
and maintain the remaining
forests — (P for biodiversity
conservation)
Private [58]
South
America
Brazil Bolsa Floresta
payments
program scheme
Sub-national Sub-national
government
(state,
municipality)
Households are paid a monthly
fee (regardless of environmental
additionality level) to reduce
conversion of primary forests on
their lands, with additional
support provided for income-
generating activities that do not
rely on deforestation — (P for
biodiversity conservation)
Communal,
Private
[60,68]
South
America
Ecuador Socio Bosque
payments
program scheme
National Federal
government
Farmers or communities are paid
a biannual fee related to the size
of their forests to be protected.
They commit to avoid land-use
change, hunting for commercial
purposes and to report third
party invasions — (P for
biodiversity conservation and
watershed regulation)
Communal,
Private
[64,66]
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Table 1 (Continued )
Region Country PES scheme PES scale PES
developer
Activities paid for and link with
desired services — (Direct or
Proxy)*
Type of
tenure
Article(s)
# in
reference
list
Central
Africa
Rwanda Nyungwe national
park payments
scheme
Local NGO Households are paid to refrain
from illicitly collecting forest
products — (P for biodiversity
conservation)
Undefined [57]
Southern
Africa
Madagascar Mantandia PES
project scheme
Local NGO Farmers are paid to reduce land-
use change and to develop
forestation activities — (P for
biodiversity conservation and
carbon sequestration)
Public [50]
Southern
Africa
Tanzania Uluguru
mountains
watershed
payments
scheme
Local NGO Farmers are paid to implement
and maintain a set of specified
soil conservation measures, such
as agro-forestry, reforestation,
grass strip planting and terrace
development — (P for watershed
regulation)
Private [59]
Southern
Africa
South Africa Working for Water
payments
program
National Federal
government
External contractors employing
farmers and communities are
paid to remove alien vegetation
species to reduce the presence
of invasive plants on country’s
scarce water resources — (P for
watershed regulation and
biodiversity conservation)
Undefined [45]
Southern
Africa
Namibia Community-
based NRM
payments
program
National Federal
government
Farmers and communities
receive a share of benefits from
photographic safaris and trophy
hunting, as well as they are
incentivized for protecting wildlife
and other natural resources —
(P for wildlife conservation)
Communal [52]
Southern
Africa
Mozambique Nhambita carbon
project scheme
Local NGO Farmers are paid to plant trees on
the farm (boundaries or in mixed
rows along with crops) — (D for
carbon sequestration levels by
planted species)
Undefined [51]
* We indicate here the activity for which targeted landowners are paid for, and we note if payments are directly related to the measurement of the
desired ecosystem services.which payments result in environmental outcomes that
would not have occurred otherwise-, cost-effectiveness,
equity, existence of conflicts and perceived legitimacy.
Such text was then summarized for explanatory pur-
poses — appearing as ‘Outcome explained’ data in Sup-
plementary Tables 1 and 2.
PES for biodiversity conservation in tropical
and sub-tropical regions
Location and typology of PES schemes
Table 1 shows that the 29 PES schemes examined are not
evenly distributed across tropical and sub-tropical regions
but concentrated in Central and South America, and less
in sub-Saharan Africa. Mexico, Cambodia and Costa Rica
have the highest number of PES schemes, with all
schemes present in Cambodia being designed by NGOs
and developed at local scales. The Costa Rican PES
national program is analyzed in seven articles, Mexico’s
national watershed payments program in four articles andCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2015, 14:150–162 the World Bank’s silvopastoral RISEMP project in three.
Consistent with other reviews [8,11], most PES schemes
have been designed and promoted by NGOs that, in most
cases, have received seed financial support from interna-
tional donors. National (6) or sub-national governments,
including states and municipalities (5), have promoted
eleven of the 29 PES schemes in our database. Logically,
national governments have supported schemes of nation-
al reach, while sub-national and local governments have
promoted schemes affecting areas within their adminis-
trative boundaries, for example, the Bolsa Floresta
scheme promoted by the Brazilian Amazonas state gov-
ernment [60,68] or the watershed payment scheme in the
Mexican municipality of Coatepec [53].
Most analyses report that schemes reward landowners
against the provision of land-use activities that constitute
a proxy of the desired ecosystem services. The exception
are project schemes linked to voluntary carbon marketswww.sciencedirect.com
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ly quantify carbon to participate in such markets
[46,51,62,68,69], or niche-based initiatives concentrating
on very particular services, such as bird nest protection
against poaching [71]. Tenure conditions underlying each
PES scheme differ across countries and according to local
realities. In Mexico, for example, national and local
schemes supporting forest conservation and manage-
ment — to provide carbon and watershed services — tar-
get lands under communal and private property as most
forests are administered by communities who hold these in
common or have divided up their lands across households.
This is also the case of programs with the same or com-
plementary objectives (biodiversity conservation) in Brazil
and Ecuador. This contrasts with the Costa Rican case,
where forests are generally owned privately and payments
strictly channeled to individual landowners.
PES schemes with a strong focus on sustainable agricul-
tural practices or agro-forestry as a proxy for biodiversity
conservation or watershed regulation target private,
household-managed lands in order to link practices, out-
comes and payments more directly [38,40,42,51,58,
59,62,70]. When PES schemes are developed on public
lands, NGOs manage targeted lands in trust or operate
jointly with the government in the design and implemen-
tation of the scheme [69]. In this regard, payment recip-
ients can include communities and households living
within a protected area (e.g. the cases of Cambodia andFigure 1
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www.sciencedirect.com Guatemala) or the NGO alone (e.g. the case of Belize). It
is worth highlighting that six articles in our database did
not specify the underlying tenure conditions of the PES
scheme and we were only able to infer those in one of the
six cases because the correspondent scheme (i.e. Costa
Rica’s PES national program) had been described exten-
sively in other contributions.
Effectiveness
Figure 1 (see Supplementary Table 1 for extended infor-
mation) includes 26 articles analyzing the effectiveness of
24 different PES schemes. However, the figure has
30 analytical observations (# bullet points) because some
articles examine more than one PES scheme. The vari-
able chosen to infer effectiveness and the methods for
data collection vary across case studies. Scholars analyze
PES effectiveness in terms of (i) changes in the level of
ecosystem service provision, that is, if the service targeted
increases or decreases; (ii) changes in land-use or habitat
provision, that is, if payments maintain or expand the type
of land-use or habitat that is used as a proxy of ecosystem
service delivery; or (iii) the combination of both variables.
Studies focused on service provision levels rely on per-
ceptions of PES actors and/or secondary data provided by
project managers, ongoing field monitoring of biodiversity
and ecosystem services in PES areas over time [52,71],
and the spatial overlap of PES areas with landscapes
providing critical ecosystem services [50] to infer effec-
tiveness. Authors concerned with changes in land useEFFECTIVE
ss assessment
ATA
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outcomes.
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156 Open issuerely on GIS data, including ground-truthing [45] and
econometric modeling, such as matching or difference-
in-difference regressions [39,41,47,48,53,55], actor
perceptions and behavioral change [43,57], and sec-
ondary project data [44]. Authors concerned with both
dimensions draw on indices to monitor changes in
service provision and habitat quality across different
types of land uses [40,49,71,72,42], as well as on GIS
and biophysical monitoring of service delivery [59].
Within the PES schemes that have been judged as
effective, there are both government-led programs imple-
mented at national scale [39,43,45,52,54,55,60,70] and
small-scale initiatives, driven by NGOs and other donors
[40,46,47,48,49–51,53,56,57,58,69,71,72,42]. Cases
described as non-effective also include a variety of typol-
ogies and implementation scales [41,44,59,60,70]. Only
seven studies have used control groups of non-PES
targeted areas or non-participants to account for con-
founding factors, such as biophysical, socio-economic,
political or institutional factors that may be influencing
PES performance [39,41,47,48,51,53,54,55].
Costa Rica’s national PES scheme has been described by
some as effective [39,55] and by others as ineffective
[41], depending on the selected geographical region and
the methods employed. The success of PES cases in
environmental terms has been related to ecological con-
ditions, for example, a strong linkage between PES
activities and ecosystem service delivery [45,42], but
mostly to scheme design and its interplay with the
socio-ecological context. The latter include PES activities
that did not induce a loss of income, but instead worked as
an upfront incentive for participants to do what PES
activities required (independently if they had planned
to do such activities anyway) [39,40,43,45,51,71]; part-
nered with local and/or external organizations to provide
technical support and reduce transaction costs [43,71];
induced local behavioral change and led to practices that
diminished resource use, or halted land-use change
[57,71]; and did not involve a major departure from
existing land-use management and cultural practices
[40,53]. Some scholars highlight the importance of pro-
viding long-term and periodically adjusted payments to
balance participants’ changing opportunity and transac-
tion costs over time [40,49], as well as preventing PES
implementation in areas with unclear tenure situations or
weakly enforced property rights [47,48,53].
Not all articles concerned with effectiveness refer explic-
itly to additionality and those referring to it include both
effective and non-effective PES schemes. PES schemes
have been judged additional when it has been considered
that the desired land-use management activities or
expected service delivery would not have been imple-
mented or achieved without PES incentives
[48,50,52,54,58]. PES schemes have been judged asCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2015, 14:150–162 non-additional by the correspondent authors when PES
activities have concentrated on land-use areas with low or
zero risk of deforestation [39,41,72], and two of these
cases have been also — and counter-intuitively — con-
sidered effective on the grounds that payments have
contributed to maintain forest cover (despite a low level
of additionality) [37,71]. Some authors highlight the dif-
ficulty of assessing PES additionality based on project
design and existing data [53] or of attributing changes in
land use or service flows to PES incentives [59]. Only two
of the articles included in our sample consider the PES
case efficient, understood as a reduction over time of the
total costs per unit of service delivery or habitat provision
of the given PES initiative [55,71]. Four articles refer to
efficiency only vaguely, considering the PES program
inefficient if non-additional [39,41], or indicating how
the PES initiative could reduce administrative expenses
or increase funding levels in the future to become less
costly per unit of PES service or targeted area [50,61].
Equity
Figure 1 above (see Supplementary Table 2 for extended
information) includes 24 articles examining the equity
outcomes of 24 different PES schemes, with 32 analytical
observations (# bullet points). We classified the author(s)’
analytical approach to equity following a three-tiered
framework: (a) equity in access, if the author(s) examined
local people’s ability to participate in the PES program;
(b) equity in decision-making, if the author(s) analyzed
participants’ perceived fairness in project decision-mak-
ing procedures; and (c) equity in outcome, if the author(s)
focused on the impact and distribution of project out-
comes, including income, across participants [62,69].
As noted in the introduction, we recognize that the equity
dimensions of PES design and implementation are prone
to subjective analysis, since they rely on the scholar(s)’
own interpretation of who is legitimately entitled to
participate in a given scheme and who has been left
out, or through local people’s own perspective of what
is fair. But some equity aspects can also be analyzed
objectively, for example measuring changes in relative
income, or participation rates and voting procedures in
meetings. For this reason it is important to be precise
about the methods, data and the indicators used to infer
the direction of such outcomes and, for this purpose, we
have distinguished between studies relying on quantita-
tive data (e.g. minutes of PES meetings, participation and
income data from household surveys) from studies based
on qualitative interviews and personal observations.
Authors looking exclusively at equity in access mostly
rely on informal interviews [39], program and project
secondary data [40,63], and only one on household and
village surveys [51]. Those concerned with equity in
outcome use interviews, focus groups and/or secondary
data [49,57,70], multi-criteria analysis [43], or onlywww.sciencedirect.com
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combine these two dimensions and/or also look at equity in
decision-making rely on qualitative research methods and/
or secondary data [45,46,52,59,62,65,69,71,42], surveys,
regressions and/or inequality indices [60,61, 67,66].
One can observe that there are only five studies that rely
on quantitative data from surveys to draw lessons about
access, decision-making and outcome. This does not in-
validate the findings of the majority of equity-related
studies but suggests that there is ample scope for develop-
ing more quantitative approaches to provide complemen-
tary ‘measures’ of equity outcomes. Seemingly, only six of
the articles focused on equity aspects pay attention to
decision-making during the design and implementation
phase of PES schemes and explain who has been included
and/or excluded in such processes. Among these, only two
draw attention to unequal bargaining power in PES design
[46,62], while none finds evidence of rent seeking by
powerful actors, in contrast to literature expectations [73].
PES schemes considered equitable as well as environ-
mentally effective encompass national PES programs
[45,52,64], and donor or NGO-driven schemes
[40,57,71]. PES schemes considered unfair in one or
more equity dimensions can be considered either effec-
tive [39,43,46,49,51,69–71,42] or ineffective [44,59,70],
but many have not been judged in this regard [61–
63,67,68,69,66]. Social conflict has been reported in
nine PES schemes [43,46,62,67,68–70,66]. Some PES
activities are reported to have encouraged and ensured
the participation of poor and non-poor households in their
design and implementation [40]; pursued gender equity
[45,52]; empowered local communities through devolved
rights in resource management [52]; and have led to a fair
distribution of material and/or non-material outcomes
across communities and individuals [52,57,71].
By contrast, other PES schemes have widened the local
income wealth gap, often unintentionally and as a result
of unfavorable local tenure and political conditions
[44,62,69], such as in Mexico’s PES program where formal
land right-holders have controlled access to payments at
village level and have tended to distribute less to non-
right-holders [46,67], or in Tanzania where the poorest
households do not have enough land to dedicate to PES
activities [59]. As already noted above, both ‘poor’ and
‘rich’ households’ participation in PES schemes has to do
with actual or perceived costs of enrolment, cultural
suitability of practices and the latter’s fit with local
environmental discourses [49,62,67]. Some of the scho-
lars’ proposals to address PES schemes’ underperfor-
mance in procedural and distributional terms include
further incentivizing poor landowners or the landless,
who often experience higher opportunity and transaction
costs, and providing them with additional external sup-
port [43]; supporting transparent and wide benefit sharing
by community-based institutions [67,71], guaranteeingwww.sciencedirect.com tenure security for the landless and non-formal right-
holders; and improving the value chains of related mar-
kets, particularly sustainably harvested timber, so as to
increase livelihood gains [43].
Renewing the PES research agenda
Our review confirms that PES implementation in the
(sub-)tropics encompass distinct implementation
approaches that diverge in conservation goals, scale of
implementation and funding approaches. Related re-
search captures the heterogeneity of PES schemes that
has been widely noted and referred to in existing liter-
ature and reviews [5,74,75]. The size of our database did
not allow for any relevant statistical inference to test any
likely relationship between the types of PES analyzed,
the scale of implementation, the targeted tenure system
and the scheme’s performance in environmental and
equity terms. However, we can conclude that scholars
report, on average, more positive environmental out-
comes in PES schemes than they report positive out-
comes in terms of equity. Spatial and/or econometric
assessments related to effectiveness are more able to
provide insights on the relative level of environmental
additionality of PES schemes, that is, being able to
compare PES participants’ and non-PES participants’
environmental performance controlling for independent
variables and confounding factors [47,48,51,53,55]. By
contrast, qualitative research seems more able to provide
insights on equity, with a majority of schemes being
judged unfair at procedural and/or distributive levels.
Positive reporting on equity is mostly based on secondary
and project management data — columns 7 and 8 of
Supplementary Table 2 — (except for Ref. [57]), while
negative reporting often relies on more extensive field-
work and primary data collection (except for Refs.
[39,44,63,71,42]). The size of our database does not allow
us to categorically affirm that more independent and
lengthy engagement in the field reveals equity-related
challenges more effectively. However, it enables us to
confirm that equity-related evidence is better captured
through qualitative analyses derived from interviews and
focus groups; very few scholars are able to quantify
aspects of equity, such as the impact of PES payments
on income inequality.
We have noted above a set of context-dependent (includ-
ing local ecologies) and scheme design and implementa-
tion conditions that are conducive to, or impede the
realization of positive effectiveness and equity effects.
Regarding the first set of conditions, effectiveness and
equity are more likely to be realized when PES land
management activities fit with locally known manage-
ment practices and resource use culture and if they fit
with the mandate of local resource management institu-
tions, particularly if PES involves social collectives (e.g. a
community). Context-dependent conditions include landCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2015, 14:150–162
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Box 1 Elements of a future PES research strategy — Activity (A)
and Goal (G)
Practitioner-informed meta-analysis of PES
- (A) to develop a global comparative analysis of case studies with
inputs provided by PES managers and knowledgeable researchers
- (G) to draw relevant and shared insights on PES design and
implementation
Larger and more cooperative research projects
- (A) to generate analyses of PES implementation informed by panel
data, in cooperation with practitioners and based on long-term
funding and cooperation
- (G) to identify PES impacts on environmental and social conditions,
controlling for confounding factors; and to investigate interactions
between incentives, individual and collective behavior, wellbeing
and local institutions
Multiple methods, data & outcome variables
- (A) to deploy multi-method, and multi-disciplinary evaluative
frameworks
- (G) to combine insights from different research techniques to draw a
complete understanding of PES effects on local and regional
ecologies, as well as on socio-economic and institutional conditionstenure relations, mediated by local governance institu-
tions, and the extent to which the latter determine who
can get involved in the PES scheme, and who can benefit
and by how much. Additionally, local opportunity costs
determine the extent to which the payment is attractive
to land users — leading to increased effectiveness when
payments exceed such value-, as well as the time horizon
during which payments are delivered — with effective-
ness and equity increasing the longer payments are dis-
bursed. As for scheme design, key aspects to foster
performance across the two dimensions include long-term
involvement of PES promoters with local recipients, in
order to provide the necessary knowledge and expertise,
as well as promoters’ ability to adapt the PES project as
tenure relations and land management costs change over
time.
Our review also demonstrates that analyses of effective-
ness and equity in PES schemes of tropical and sub-
tropical regions have not paid attention to economic costs
data, such as the opportunity cost of alternative land use
activities, or the transaction costs of program manage-
ment and monitoring [5]. This is surprising given that
effectiveness would need to be related to actual land
management costs in order to find out the level of cost-
effectiveness and to draw insights on PES efficiency over
time. The lack of studies on PES cost-effectiveness has
been explained by the fact that most schemes in the
global South lack clear metrics to quantify the ecosystem
services being delivered, and thus the corresponding
associated costs. Those schemes focused on carbon are
the most notable exception [76]. However, we argue that,
while cost constraints are important, lack of reflection as
regards cost-effectiveness is also related to insufficient
attention to the issue and the common inability of
researchers to access data on opportunity costs, and
project start-up, transaction and running costs.
The fact that the methodological approaches chosen by
scholars to investigate PES performance in terms of
environmental effectiveness and social equity differ
broadly, responds to the variety of research budgets
available and the scientific schools interested in under-
standing this conservation tool, which range from land-
use scientists to economists, anthropologists and critical
geographers. However, we think that future PES research
would benefit from some level of analytical integration
and coordinated research effort to holistically understand
the environmental and social outcomes that PES could
generate if well targeted and fairly implemented by
practitioners. In doing so, scientific research could be
more helpful in providing sound and more coherent
evidence to PES implementing actors, governments
and both donors and service ‘buyers’.
The relationship between effectiveness and equity in
PES has already been theorized [21,77] but our reviewCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2015, 14:150–162 suggests that there is still a weak link between the two
dimensions in empirical studies. This is reflected in the
central vertical column and horizontal row of Figure 1
which refer to several articles that do not reflect on PES
effectiveness or equity outcomes. A future PES strategy
(Box 1) can concentrate on a number of elements. First,
scholars can continue to pursue the development of global
reviews, following systematic review protocols, and ide-
ally develop a comparable database of PES cases world-
wide that can help identifying challenges and trends in
PES design and implementation, looking at both effec-
tiveness and equity. Those interested particularly in
equity could also consider the challenge of developing
syntheses of existing narratives on PES in a way that can
be complementary to other reviews based on larger data
and more systematic syntheses.
Second, there should be a focus on larger research pro-
jects that could follow PES implementation in multiple
locations, focusing on one or various PES typologies, and
based on a shared research framework — drawing, for
example, on similar experiences in common-pool re-
source management and rural livelihoods research
[78,79]. These projects should be developed in partner-
ship with PES practitioners, not only to access sites over
time for research purposes but to develop locally-in-
formed ‘theories of change’ that could be tested during
and/or after PES implementation. As it has been sug-
gested elsewhere [80,81], coming up with context-
specific hypotheses  related to environmental and
socio-economic outcomes is fundamental to rule out
alternative explanations of positive or negative
change — that could be wrongly attributed to PES activ-
ities-, and to provide more accurate lessons for practi-
tioners and donors.www.sciencedirect.com
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methods. Spatial land use data from remote sensing,
complemented with on-the-ground monitoring trans-
ects, have been mostly applied to understand changes
in the correspondent ecological outcome variables, such
as forest cover or plant diversity. As regards equity out-
comes, surveys and interviews have been used to reflect
on PES procedural and distributional effects, such as
presence of conflict, changes in resource governance,
impact on relative income, and benefit sharing. The
use of coupled ecological and socio-economic data in
econometric matching techniques with difference-in-
difference regression models can be helpful to compare
performance between PES and non-PES sites of selected
variables.
Precisely, involving control groups that act as counter-
factuals and panel datasets of ecological and socio-eco-
nomic data in PES assessment frameworks would be
consistent with an increasingly common approach in
impact assessments of development and conservation
policy [82–84]. We recognize that such an approach
involves a set of challenges related to the possibility of
selecting valid land-use polygons, village and household
controls, particularly in contexts of poor socio-economic
and governance data availability, as well as the more
recurrent problems in panel data research, including data
gathering costs, data consistency and changing circum-
stances in both project and control groups, for example,
due to migration processes. Connecting well-grounded
‘theories of change’ with measures of effect means that
many studies of PES initiatives will benefit from com-
bining research methods, and qualitative work will con-
tinue to be critical to understand how people subjectively
think and feel about any observed ecological and equity
effects derived from PES.
In conclusion, this article set out to review scholarship
literature on PES implementation in tropical and sub-
tropical regions. Our database rendered a limited number
of (case) studies, which suggests that first-hand empirical
evidence on ongoing schemes might be scarcer than one
might think given the popularity of the policy mecha-
nism. Seemingly, we have demonstrated that PES
schemes appear to be more effective in environmental
terms than socially equitable. This is probably our most
worrying finding given current grounded calls for incor-
porating equity criteria in PES design. We have identified
critical methodological gaps related to developing panel
data and control-based assessments of PES distributional
outcomes, particularly in relation to payment effects on
household or collective incomes. In light of these find-
ings, we have advocated for a more multi-disciplinary and
integrated wave of empirical research that, on the one
hand, builds on and supports the evolving and growing
literature on conservation policy impact assessment and,
on the other, relies on practitioners as key researchwww.sciencedirect.com partners and on PES and research donors as key funding
supporters.
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